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Abstract 
 
The Uncertain Future of Global Freshwater Resources 
 
Megan Dunleavy Ferré, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2015 
 
Supervisor:  Joel P. Johnson 
 
Projections regarding the future of conditions on Earth vary widely. Climate 
change, both human-induced and naturally-forced, is expected to have many far-reaching 
implications, including altering current global weather patterns and terrestrial freshwater 
supply.  Already, terrestrial water fluxes have been affected by human demand and 
interventions.  Examples of human-induced impacts include dam and reservoir building, 
water withdrawals from ground and surface water for agricultural, industrial, and 
municipal use, as well as environmental sanitation impacts. Since the 1970’s, concurrent 
with rising global mean temperature, freshwater discharge from rivers to the world’s 
oceans has been decreasing. 
In the United States, the Southwest (from the headwaters of the westernmost 
Colorado River to the Mexican border, encompassing California, Nevada, Utah, and 
Colorado) has experienced three extreme drought years since the start of the 21
st
 century.  
Projections indicate that precipitation over the lower mid-latitude continental regions, 
 vii 
including the southwestern United States, will continue to decrease as a result of 
continuing greenhouse gas emissions and increasing global mean temperature.  Colorado 
River flow reached the ocean in mid-2014 as part of a restorative experiment agreed to by 
the United States and Mexico, but had not previously reached the ocean since 1998.  
Rivers in Australia, Africa, and Asia are experiencing the same phenomena, with human 
extraction impairing the river’s natural ability to meet the sea. There are political and 
technological techniques that could mediate regional decreases in freshwater supply.  In 
particular, large changes in agricultural use are necessary to compensate for oncoming 
climate shifts and to ensure that the worldwide population has access to enough water for 
survival. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 Discussions about the future of water resources have been occurring for centuries, 
with modern concerns centering on the risks associated with a changing climate.  
Adaptive steps to counter projected changes or actions to change human behavior in 
order to preserve resources have been inadequate for offsetting anticipated shortages in 
freshwater availability in some regions of the world.  In the United States, people living 
in the south or the west will experience the effects of drought periods at home, since the 
knowledge of most people is local, but future changes are projected to occur globally. 
This study is intended to close the gap in knowledge and enhance comprehension about 
the global state of water resources, while also encouraging interest in the state of water 
resources “at home” in the southwestern United States.  The following sections will begin 
by widely describing the state of global water availability and the changes that are 
projected to occur due to human influence and global warming.  Next, case studies from 
three different continents are discussed to give a more detailed description of projected 
changes on a smaller scale.  Finally, an in-depth look at the current state and projected 
changes for the Colorado River in the southwestern United States is presented.   
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Global Changes in Water Availability 
Climate models project future global changes to the current patterns of water 
supply, while demographic projections indicate continued increases in demand.  
Simultaneously, human-induced impacts, from activities such as the dam construction 
and water withdrawals from ground and surface water are already altering the status of 
water supplies.  The combined effects of impacts from current human influences and 
demands on resources are significant and place extreme pressure on water resource 
systems.  The anticipated climate variation and projected large-scale irreversible changes 
herald chronic effects and critical scarcity in the future.  In fact, environmental changes 
are already taking place; concurrent with increases in global mean temperature, 
freshwater discharge to the oceans has been decreasing since the 1970’s (Cayan et al., 
2010; Dai et al., 2009).  Future change in river runoff, a proxy for renewable water 
resources, is linked to changes in precipitation and temperature, which are driven by 
global greenhouse gas emissions (Tang and Lettenmaier, 2012).  Unlike runoff, which 
can be managed, the consumption of nonrenewable water resources is highly 
unsustainable.  Once a society exhausts their nonrenewable resources, their vulnerability 
to water scarcity is exacerbated.  Furthermore, water resources are frequently 
transboundary by nature with the result that one country has the potential to be affected 
not only by changes within its boundaries, but changes in upstream water use and supply 
as well, (Milman et al., 2013). 
Globally, there is an average of 42,750 km
3
 of renewable water available to use 
each year, with the majority of available resources located in Asia and South America, 
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leaving Europe and Australia with the smallest volumes of water (Shiklomanov, 2000).  
The distribution of water resources, however, does not match the distribution of the 
world’s population; as a result, people living in heavily populated areas are vying for 
fewer resources in competition with massive numbers of people.  More than 40% of 
global river runoff originates in Brazil, Russia, Canada, the United States, China and 
India.  However, China, India, and the United States are also the three most populated 
countries in the world, with Brazil and Russia placing fifth and ninth respectively 
(Shiklomanov, 2000; United States Census Bureau, 2015). Global water is always 
moving, as the water cycle transports water (in the form of precipitation) from continental 
interiors to the world’s oceans and back.  It typically moves water to a different place 
than where it evaporated.  From 1920 to 1985, there was a trend of decreasing water 
availability in Africa and increasing availability in South America (Shiklomanov, 2000).  
Seasonality is also important: many of the world’s rivers experience flooding as a result 
of seasonal snowmelt or monsoons; therefore water is only readily available for a portion 
of the year.  In an average year, 46% of river runoff worldwide occurs between May and 
August (Shiklomanov, 2000).   
From 1901 to 2010, precipitation increased in eastern North America, southern 
South America, northern Europe, northern and central Asia, and parts of Australia.  Over 
the same time period, however, precipitation declined in the Sahel of Africa, the 
Mediterranean, southern African and southern and eastern Asia, with much of the change 
in precipitation evident since 1951 (Figure 1) (IPCC, 2013).  Globally, areas experiencing 
drought have expanded since the 1970s coincident with increasing frequency of heat 
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waves, rising global temperatures, and decreasing snow and ice cover (IPCC, 2013).  
Future projections, based on global hydrological models and general circulation models, 
as well as emissions scenarios, include the likely possibility of precipitation increasing at 
high latitudes and some mid-latitudes, but declining or continuing current patterns of 
decline over the Middle East, the Mediterranean, southern North America, southern 
Africa, and southern Australia (Figure 2) (Hagemann et al., 2013; IPCC, 2013).  
Evapotranspiration is expected to follow the same pattern, but the increase is expected to 
spread further southward, with the absolute values of evapotranspiration depending on 
the emissions scenario (more emissions lead to higher evapotranspiration) (Hagemann et 
al., 2013).   
 
Figure 1: Percent change (%) in average precipitation worldwide from 1986 to 2005 
(left) and projected changes for 2081-2100 (right), from IPCC (2013). 
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Figure 2: Changes in average precipitation (mm/year) projected by three global 
climate models following the A2 IPCC emissions scenario for 2071-2100 
compared to the 1971-2000 average, from Hagemann et al. (2013). 
The greatest runoff decreases are projected in areas that are already arid or semi-
arid and the number of river basins in which runoff is expected to decrease will likely 
increase as mean temperature also increases, affecting larger and larger populations and 
negatively impacting gross domestic product (GDP) (IPCC, 2013; Tang and Lettenmaier, 
2012).  Global climate models agree that available water is expected to decline in semi-
arid basins such as those in central, eastern, and southern Europe, and the Tigris, 
Euphrates, Mississippi, Xhu Jiang, Murray-Darling, Okavango, and Limpopo River 
basins (Figure 3) (Hagemann et al., 2013). 
In many cases, however, models do not include human interventions when 
making projections for the future, and therefore human construction (dams) and 
withdrawals (e.g. for irrigation) are not taken into account (Hagemann et al., 2013).  This 
can, then, inherently lead to error within projections for the future of terrestrial water.  
Humans do not adhere to the rules of nature: water can be removed from dams whenever 
a society feels the need, not necessarily when nature would dictate.  This unpredictability 
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can lead to further error in estimates of future water need and availability. Additionally, 
water withdrawals from one location may end up somewhere else entirely, leading to 
further consequences where the water is removed, but lessening the consequences (or 
delaying the inevitable) for the location to which the water is relocated.  Societies tend to 
be built upon the assumption that where water once was, it will always be, however as 
water availability continues to decrease, many locations will have to cope with the fact 
that water will not always be available and use local conservation techniques to maintain 
some supply (Fishman, 2011). 
 
Figure 3: Seasonal changes in runoff (mm/season) projected by global hydrological 
models and global climate models following the A2 IPCC emissions 
scenario for 2071-2100 compared to the 1971-2000 average.  Each panel 
shows season: a) December, January, February, b) March, April, May, c) 
June, July, August, d) September, October, November, from Hagemann et 
al. (2013). 
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Models by Vörösmarty et al. (2000) were run using data and projections based on 
1985, with the hope of determining the future state of global water resources in 2025, as 
affected by both climate change and human development.  In 1995, one-third of the 
global population lived under conditions of water scarcity and 450 million were under 
severe water stress.  By 2000, the population living in severe water stress conditions 
evolved to 1.76 billion people (Vörösmarty et al., 2000).  By 2025, 80% of the world’s 
population could face similar severe water stress conditions (Shiklomanov, 2000).  It is 
an important assumption that humans have access to the mean annual surface and shallow 
aquifer runoff in the form of river discharge to use for domestic, industrial, and 
agricultural purposes.  For the purposes of these models, water extraction is coming 
solely from rivers rather than nonrenewable groundwater.  Model results showed that 
mean global runoff varied due to climate change from an increase of <1 mm/year to a 
decrease of 17 mm/year, but larger changes were found at both local and regional scales 
(Vörösmarty et al., 2000).   
Three scenarios were considered: (1) varying climate but fixing the magnitude 
and distribution of population and water use at the 1985 level, (2) maintaining the 
contemporary climate, runoff, and discharge but applying projected water demands for 
2025, and (3) changing climate and water demands, a combination of both prior scenarios 
(Vörösmarty et al., 2000).  Total per capita water use is projected to decrease from 640 to 
580 m
3
/year between 1985 and 2025, however the global population is expected to 
increase.  Therefore, in scenarios 2 and 3 the impacts of human development do not 
reflect the intensification of water use, but the effect of population growth and worldwide 
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migration (Vörösmarty et al., 2000).  Results from scenario 1 show little difference from 
climate projections, as would be expected.  Results from scenario 2 show an 85% 
increase in the vulnerable population from 1985 to 2025 (Figure 4).  Upon investigating 
agriculture, Vörösmarty et al. (2000) discover that the number of people dependent on 
irrigated lands in areas of high water stress increases by over 33% (Table 1).  This 
reflects the growing global population, as irrigation is expected to sustain the same 
percentage of the population as in 1985 (40%) but with much less water availability. 
 
Figure 4: The distribution of global population in 1985 experiencing high or low 
water stress.  A DIA/Q value of 0.4 or greater is indicative that a population 
is undergoing severe water scarcity (indicated in red shades).  As this figure 
was created using 1985 population and water use statistics, it is likely that 
the highly stressed areas have expanded with growing population and 
increasing usage, from Vörösmarty et al. (2000). 
Building upon the research of Vörösmarty et al. (2000), Alcamo et al. (2007) use 
two Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) emissions scenarios (scenario 
A2 shows increasing greenhouse gas emissions and B2 shows a much slower rate of 
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climate change) to determine the significance of climate change and anthropogenic water 
withdrawals on future water availability.  Both the A2 and B2 scenarios show that water 
will become less available as time passes.  Half of the population of northern Africa and 
the Middle East is already experiencing extreme water scarcity conditions (< 500 m
3
 
water yearly per capita) (WWAP, 2015).  In 1995, 21.6% of global river basin areas were 
experiencing severe water stress conditions (withdrawals > availability), but by the 2050s 
severely water stressed areas are projected to cover 26% of the globe (Alcamo et al., 
2007).  Furthermore, over 60% of global river basin area will experience increasing water 
stress through the 2050s, while less than 30% will experience lessening stress due to 
increased precipitation and water-use efficiency (Alcamo et al., 2007).   
 
Table 1: The distribution of global population and their domestic and industrial water 
needs over the water supply (A) and agricultural needs over water supply 
(B) in three different scenarios.  DI/Q and A/Q of 0.2 to 0.4 indicate 
medium to high water stress and DI/Q and A/Q of 0.4 or greater indicate 
sever water stress.  Scenario 1 (Sc1) changes climate but holds population 
needs steady at 1985 levels, scenario 2 (Sc2) holds the climate at 1985 
levels but uses projected water needs for 2025, scenario 3 (Sc3) is a 
combination in which both climate and water needs change, from 
Vörösmarty et al. (2000). 
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Areas in which withdrawals and consumption greatly outstrip water availability 
(runoff) by the 2050s include northern and southern Africa, the Middle East, central and 
southern Asia, the southwestern United States, and parts of western and northeastern 
South America (Figure 5) (Alcamo et al., 2007).  The total population projected to be 
living in severely water stressed regions by the 2050s ranges from 4.63 to 6.92 billion 
people (48% to 72% of the projected 2050 population of 9.6 billion); however, this 
depends on migration, population growth, and distribution in the future (Alcamo et al., 
2007).  It is expected that developing countries will continue to increase their population, 
using more water, not necessarily per capita, but simply because there are more people.  
Relative water availability (river runoff divided by population) in these locations is 
projected to be an average of 4.5 times lower in 2025 than in 1950 due to this growth, 
which doesn’t begin to account for runoff changes due to climatic variation  
(Shiklomanov, 2000).  Alcamo et al. (2007) attribute much of the decrease in water 
availability to climate change: as the temperature increases, evapotranspiration increases, 
and in some locations the increase in evapotranspiration is enough to offset an increase in 
precipitation, leading to a decrease in water availability despite more rainfall.  However, 
an increase in per capita income could also play a non-insignificant role: as people 
individually make more money, particularly in currently low-income countries, they can 
afford to pay for (more) water and therefore domestic use drives an increase in 
withdrawals in addition to population growth and climate change (Alcamo et al., 2007). 
 
 11 
 
Figure 5: Locations in the world projected to be experiencing sever water stress in the 
2050s under the A2 IPCC emissions scenario.  In these locations, three 
indicators of water stress overlapped (withdrawals to availability ratio, 
consumption to monthly discharge ratio, and availability to population ratio) 
and produce reasonably accurate projections for the future, from Alcamo et 
al. (2007). 
Haddeland et al. (2013) used results extracted from the Water Model 
Intercomparison Project and the Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison Project in 
order to provide projections for future water availability globally based on a global 
projected temperature increase of 2-3 ⁰C (as projected by the IPCC).  As would be 
expected, anthropogenic water consumption consistently lead to a decrease in runoff.  
During the control period (1971-2000), human use decreased runoff by 5% or more in the 
Midwestern and Western United States and the mid-latitude regions of Asia (Haddeland 
et al., 2013).  However, when anthropogenic withdrawals are removed and only climate 
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change signals are used as factors impacting runoff, decreases are also evident in the 
Mediterranean, southern Australia, and Central and South America.  As climate change 
does not affect all locations equally, there are areas that are anticipated to experience an 
increase in precipitation and runoff: northern latitudes, the Arabian Peninsula, India, and 
western Africa (Haddeland et al., 2013).  Wholly, Haddeland et al. (2013) state that 
climate change is the globally predominant factor in causing changes to runoff, with the 
exception of the Nile, Colorado, and Indus River Basins.  In these locations, climate 
change is not enough to balance anthropogenic use, and can even enhance the effect of 
withdrawals, resulting in larger than expected decreases in runoff (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6: Comparison between how human withdrawals and climate change affect 
runoff in river basins globally.  Panel A shows the control period (1971-
2000) human impacts compared to natural simulations.  Panel B shows 
expressed natural changes in response to a 2 K global mean temperature 
increase compared to control period natural simulations.  Panel C shows the 
impact of human withdrawals in response to a 2 K global temperature 
increase compared to control period natural simulations, from Haddeland et 
al. (2013). 
Runoff elasticity is a measure of how much change in runoff can be expected to 
accompany a certain percent change in precipitation, where higher values indicate a 
larger response in runoff for a certain change in precipitation (Tang and Lettenmaier, 
2012).  Using the 194 largest river basins in the world (supplying water to 60% of the 
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population and 50% of the GDP), Tang and Lettenmaier (2012) found little difference in 
the runoff sensitivities for different IPCC emissions scenarios, but runoff elasticities 
varied regionally: lower values (< 1.8) were projected for the mid-latitudes of the 
Northern Hemisphere and higher values (> 2.2) were projected for the mid-latitudes of 
the Southern Hemisphere, Australia, equatorial Africa, eastern North America, and 
eastern Asia (Figure 7).  Locally, runoff sensitivities per degree Celsius of warming range 
from -6% to -2%, with the highest values in eastern North America, southern Europe, and 
eastern Asia (Tang and Lettenmaier, 2012).  Few basins in Australia, northwest Africa, 
and southern Asia actually experience increased runoff with temperature changes; despite 
higher temperatures most often being associated with more evapotranspiration, higher 
temperatures can sometimes lead to increased frequency of extreme precipitation (Figure 
7) (Tang and Lettenmaier, 2012). 
Dai et al. (2009) explained that increased runoff in central and eastern Russia 
cannot be explained by an increased frequency of extreme precipitation and instead is 
likely related to increasing local temperature.  This led to decreasing snow cover and 
thawing permafrost, releasing water that had been held in storage for many years.  As 
expected, trends in precipitation and local temperature from 1948 to 2004 coincide with 
regional runoff trends.  The decrease in precipitation over Africa, southeastern Asia and 
eastern Australia and the increase in precipitation over the United States, Argentina, and 
northwestern Australia are both reflected in basin-scale runoff (Dai et al., 2009).  Over 
this time period, effects of human activities and withdrawals on annual runoff are small 
compared to the effects of climate; however, accumulated over time, these small human-
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induced effects may result in real changes to the basins and the world’s oceans (Dai et al., 
2009).  More recent work by Haddeland et al. (2013) confirms this result, with the 
understanding that in some locations, anthropogenic usage, primarily agriculture, does 
account for the majority of the visible changes in runoff. 
 
Figure 7. A. Runoff elasticities with respect to mean annual change in precipitation 
over 194 river basins.  Higher values indicate a larger response in runoff for 
a certain change in precipitation. B.  Runoff elasticities with respect to 
temperature changes (percent change in runoff per ⁰C change in 
temperature), from Tang and Lettenmaier (2012). 
As of 1995, the world withdrew an average of 3,790 km
3
/year of water, but by 
2025, average global water withdrawal is expected to reach 5,240 km
3
/year 
(Shiklomanov, 2000).  Spatially, the distribution of water withdrawals and the percentage 
of renewable water being withdrawn within continents is imbalanced: 95% of European 
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withdraws are in the south and central parts of the continent, but this only accounts for 
about 25% of the renewable water available (Shiklomanov, 2000).  In North America, 
73% of total withdrawals (28% of renewable resources) are made by the United States, 
and 50% of African withdrawals (totaling 95% of the available renewable water in the 
area) are made in Northern Africa (Shiklomanov, 2000).  The majority of global 
withdrawal and consumption takes place for agriculture in Asia, but a 150% increase in 
withdrawal is expected in Africa and South America by 2025 as these countries continue 
to develop and are able to afford more usage (Alcamo, 2007; Shiklomanov, 2000). 
Globally, irrigation accounts for 69% of withdrawals (but 85% of total 
consumption), with the highest use regions are in southern and eastern Asia which use a 
combined 1676 km
3
/year, the majority of which is freshwater (FAO, 2012; Hanasaki et 
al., 2008; Shiklomanov, 2000).  Compared to Australia and New Zealand (11 km
3
/year), 
North America (259 km
3
/year) and the Middle East (231 km
3
/year), the south and eastern 
Asia usage is over six times as high (FAO, 2012).  With the exception of Europe, where 
most of the water withdrawals fuel industry, withdrawals in all other continents are 
predominated by agricultural usage.  In order to sustain the population in 2050, 
worldwide agricultural production will need to increase by 60% (WWAP, 2015).  As 
climate change and global warming continue, potential irrigation water consumption will 
increase with temperature both regionally and globally and therefore without changes in 
agricultural practices (shifting crow growth to regions which receive more precipitation, 
more efficient irrigation techniques), water needs will eventually outstrip water supply 
(Haddeland et al., 2013). 
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In the United States alone, irrigation accounts for approximately one-third of all 
water withdrawals and 38% of freshwater withdrawals, second only to thermoelectric 
power which uses 45% of all water withdrawn in the country, 73% of which was fresh 
surface water (USGS, 2010).  Nearly 17% of water is lost before it even reaches its 
destination due to leaky pipes, a problem that is simple to solve, yet cost prohibitive 
(Fishman, 2011).  Of all the states in the United States, the four states of Texas, 
California, Idaho, and Florida account for use of over 25% of the total water withdrawn 
in the nation, with irrigation dominating the usage in California (> 60%) and Idaho (81%) 
and thermoelectric power dominating in both Texas (45%) and Florida (61%) (USGS, 
2010).  By 2025, global agricultural usage is expected to utilize 1.3 times as much water 
and land as at present, and industrial and domestic usage are expected to increase at least 
1.5 times each.  Evaporation, which removes available water from the system, contributes 
as much to water loss as the total consumption of industrial and domestic use combined, 
and that value is expected to grow with increasing temperatures (Alcamo et al., 2007; 
Shiklomanov, 2000). 
The cumulative abstraction-to-demand (CAD) ratio is used as a measure of 
irrigation water scarcity (Hanasaki et al., 2008).  When the CAD ratio is high, water is 
plentiful and crops are receiving enough water, and when the CAD ratio is low, water is 
scarce.  Haddeland et al. (2013) calculated the CAD ratio for a control period between 
1971 and 2000, and found the highest value on the Indian subcontinent.  Globally, the 
CAD ratio is expected to decease as mean temperature increases (higher temperatures are 
typically indicative of more evaporation and therefore less water), which has the potential 
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to affect food production, availability, and pricing.  The CAD ratio is projected to 
increase in only a few areas, namely western India and some small coastal areas around 
the globe; these are areas that are projected to experience an increase in precipitation.  
Though globally the CAD ratio is expected to decrease, the value of the ratio depends on 
the region and, therefore, overall global water consumption may not be as important to 
consider as seasonal and regional changes caused by consumption and the usage of dams 
and reservoirs (Haddeland et al., 2013).   
Another useful ratio is DIA/Q, or the global domestic, industrial, and agricultural 
water needs over global discharge, (Vörösmarty et al., 2000).  The larger the ratio (needs 
> discharge), the more scarce water is globally because the population needs more than it 
has access to in the form of river discharge.  With climate change alone, DIA/Q increases 
by < 5%.  With rising water demands only, DIA/Q increases by 50%.  The combined 
increase is greater than the sum of its parts, 60% (Vörösmarty et al., 2000).  Over each 
continent, climate change is only responsible for -4% to 12% of the total change, 
indicating that population and economic growth worldwide play a much larger role in 
influencing water demand.  DIA/Q is fundamentally similar to the withdrawal to 
availability ratio (WWR) used by Hanasaki et al. (2008), and is calculated as the annual 
water withdrawal over runoff, or streamflow.  The output is an indication of water stress, 
with low WWR values (<0.2) indicating low or no stress and high WWR values (>0.4) 
indicating high stress.  Medium-high stressed areas are found in western India across the 
Middle East, northern Africa, the Midwestern United States, and northern China through 
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central Asia and the population living in these stressed areas is 1.25 billion (Hanasaki et 
al., 2008).  
These indicators are mainly calculated on an annual or global basis, but areas that 
experience monsoons or El Niño/La Niña conditions experience precipitation patterns 
that are highly variable throughout the year.  The cumulative withdrawal to demand ratio 
(CWD) is used to determine if water needs are fulfilled on a subannual basis (Hanasaki et 
al., 2008).  Here, higher CWD values indicate less stress and results show a different 
distribution of stress than indicated in the yearly WWR calculation.  Seasonally stressed 
areas include the Sahel region of Africa, southern Africa, and the Asian monsoon region; 
all are areas in which there is an uneven distribution in the timing of precipitation and 
withdrawals (Hanasaki et al., 2008).  Model results using coupled atmosphere-ocean 
general circulation models, global hydrological models, and IPCC emissions scenarios 
project that seasonal reductions in available water will also occur in in the mid-latitudes 
of eastern South America, the eastern United States and eastern Europe during spring 
Europe, western Siberia, and western North America during summer, northwestern South 
America in autumn, and southern Africa in winter (Hagemann et al., 2013). 
Measures need to be taken if freshwater access is to be maintained in usable 
quantities for society.  In a world with a population greater than seven billion and 
continuing to grow, unevenly distributed water resources that are diminishing in some of 
the most populated locations pose a serious threat to the current way of life.  In the most 
densely populated regions of Asia, central and southern Europe, northern Africa and the 
Middle East, the amount of water that is available in rivers and in reservoirs is not 
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enough to sustain industrial development, agriculture, and the population in the future 
(Shiklomanov, 2000).  More developed countries inherently have a better capacity to 
cope with oncoming changes than do less developed countries, but even the most highly 
developed countries have not sustainably solved the problems associated with decreasing 
water availability (Milman et al., 2013). 
Though economically expensive and politically difficult, agricultural and 
industrial practices must be made more efficient, wastewater needs to be effectively 
cleaned and reused (and the public needs to be convinced that “toilet to tap” does provide 
safe drinking water), water should be collected and stored whenever possible, river runoff 
should become regulated, more electricity should be provided by solar and wind power 
than power plants that require cooling towers, and desalination may need to become more 
of an option for the distant future (Fishman, 2011; IPCC, 2007; WWAP, 2015).  Global 
warming is not likely to stop anytime soon without significant interference and 
regulations on emissions throughout the world.  The mean global temperature will 
continue to rise as a result. This will alter precipitation patterns and influence 
evapotranspiration, bringing more water to some regions and leaving other parts of the 
globe highly stressed.  If no measures are taken, the global water demand is projected to 
exceed supply by 40% as soon as 2030 (WWAP, 2015).  Cooperation between nations 
that share the same water resources, as well as between politicians and scientists, is key 
to maintaining renewable water available to all. 
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Select Global Case Studies 
Grafton et al. (2013) examined the Yellow (China), Murray-Darling (Australia), 
and Orange-Senqu (southern Africa) Rivers and found that median outflows for the most 
recent five years prior to the publishing of their paper for which data was available were 
only 41%, 12% and 33% of the natural outflows for each river, respectively.  Though the 
Yellow River may have experienced a downward trend in precipitation, there has been no 
such change in the Murray-Darling and Orange-Senqu basins, and therefore the 
discrepancy in outflow is likely associated with the removal of water from the rivers for 
human use. 
In 1949, the Yellow River provided irrigation for 0.8 million hectares, but by 
1997 it irrigated over 7.5 million hectares (Grafton et al., 2013).  Over this time period 
there has been a 35% decline in flow.  The frequency of zero-flow sections of the river 
has increased with events starting earlier in the year and lasting longer.  In 1997 alone 
there was no outflow into the ocean for 330 days. Some of this decline can be attributed 
to decreases in precipitation and increases in temperature over this time period, but the 
decline in flow is much more severe than the decline in rainfall, and is mainly attributable 
to population increase and economic development. Four rivers that feed into the Yellow 
River (the Kuye, Tuwei, Wuding, and Jialu Rivers) have all experienced significant 
decreases in runoff since the 1950s, and the Yellow River as a whole has experienced an 
overall decrease in annual runoff greater than 8000 km
3
 in the last fifty years (Wang et 
al., 2011; Wu and Xia, 2014).   
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Furthermore, though climate change has contributed to decreasing runoff, the 
influence of human activity and withdrawals (agricultural, industrial, and municipal) has 
been increasing (Figure 8).  Human activity not only has an influence on water quantity, 
but also on water quality: the pH of the Yellow River declined from 1992 to 2000 due to 
increasing emissions and the concentration of dissolved ions increased either due to 
increased weathering or to the concentrating of ions in less water (Wu and Xia, 2014). In 
2002, changes in the operation of the Xiaolangdi Reservoir did restore some runoff and 
discharge to the Yellow River delta, which in turn revived biodiversity, tourism, and 
water supply, but outflow today is still below the natural flow of the river as recently as 
50 years ago (Grafton et al., 2013).  The existing water use regime along the Yellow 
River basin, combined with the effects of climate change and global warming could result 
in a 9-29% decrease in future flow of the river (Grafton et al., 2013). 
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Figure 8: Change in runoff in the Tuwei and Kuye Rivers, which feed into the Yellow 
River, and the respective impacts of climate change and human activity on 
overall change, from Wang et al. (2011). 
Over two million people live within and get their water from the Murray-Darling 
River basin in southeastern Australia, and over one million additional people living in 
Adelaide, just outside the basin, get their municipal water from the Murray-Darling River 
as well (Sullivan, 2014).  Over 80% of the 1.06 million km
2
 land-area in the basin is 
agricultural in nature (rice and cotton predominate), providing 40% of the food produced 
in Australia and using 60% of the nation’s total agricultural water use (Grafton et al., 
2013; Leblanc et al., 2012; Sullivan, 2014; Wildman Jr. and Forde, 2012).  The river 
already experiences high variability in flow due to historic multiple-year droughts and 
intermittent large floods.  However, irrigation still accounts for 90% of the freshwater 
diverted away from the river, leading floodplains along the Murray-Darling River to 
become dryer and the incidence of zero-flow years at the Murray River delta to increase 
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from 1% (pre-European settlement) to over 40%; projections suggest that by 2030, zero 
or low flow events may increase to 69% as a result of continued water use and climate 
change (Grafton et al., 2013).  By this time, climate change alone is projected to decrease 
surface water in the Murray-Darling River basin by an average of 11% (Leblanc et al., 
2012). 
The 1997-2009 Millennium Drought is the most severe drought on record, caused 
by a combination of lower than average precipitation leading to an even larger decrease 
in runoff (Leblanc et al., 2012).  With less runoff to rely on, Australians turned to 
groundwater and depleted resources further (Figure 9).  During this dry period, some 
lakes and river channels within the basin became acidic, salinity levels in a coastal lagoon 
nearby the river increased to five times the salinity of the ocean, and biodiversity sharply 
declined as a result (Grafton et al., 2013).  Even prior to the drought, salinity in the basin 
due to irrigation, land cover change, and the deposition of windblown salts from the 
ocean into the basin caused degradation of water resources, biodiversity, and agricultural 
production (Leblanc et al., 2012).  Should water become less available than it currently is, 
droughts like the Millennium Drought may become more normal than abnormal, salinity 
may increase, and resources and diversity could become more permanently damaged.  
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Figure 9: Changes in a) groundwater storage, b) soil moisture storage simulated by the 
Global Land Data Assimilation System, and c) surface water storage in the 
Murray-Darling River basin from 2000-2009 relative to the 2000-2008 
average values.  This represents the last ten years of the Millennium 
Drought, from Leblanc et al. (2014). 
The Orange-Senqu River basin extends over 1 million km
2
, covering parts of 
Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and South Africa (Kranz et al., 2010).  The river has been 
developed for domestic, industrial, and agricultural water extractions and is a host to 31 
major dams.  Development is expected to continue with population growth.  Endemic to 
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development is the societal problem of waste, and water within the Orange-Senqu basin 
has been degraded by both industrial and municipal sewage being discharged directly into 
rivers (Kranz et al., 2010; Olutayo, 2012).  The region is already water stressed with a per 
capita availability of 1000 m
3
/year.  Shiklomanov (2000) defines catastrophically low 
availability as < 1000 m
3
/year per capita, very low availability as 1000 to 2100 m
3
/year 
per capita, and low availability as 2100 to 5000 m
3
/year per capita.  Climate change is 
expected to increase this water stress by reducing precipitation, thereby reducing runoff, 
leaving more people with less water and leaving available water more polluted; a 
reduction in precipitation in Lesotho is evident as beginning in the 1960s (Earle, 2005; 
Olutayo, 2012).  Any attempts at adapting to scarcer water conditions by increasing 
storage capacity may be negated if there is little water left to store (Kranz et al., 2010). 
Because the Orange-Senqu River basin is spread over four countries, politics and 
water trading are important in the distribution of available water resources.  Though 
Lesotho is the least politically powerful among the four countries, it historically receives 
the most rainfall and the resulting Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) brings in 
money by supplying water to South Africa.  It is possible that Lesotho will also supply 
water to Botswana in the future, but future development in all countries depends partially 
on the availability of water (Earle et al., 2005).  The LHWP interbasin transfer treaty was 
signed in 1986 and paid little attention to environmental side effects of pumping water 
from Lesotho to Johannesburg.  Little change is likely to occur quickly, as South Africa, 
being the most powerful country relying on Orange-Senqu River water, does not look 
favorably on renegotiating water allocations (Kranz et al., 2010).  The South African 
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government created a project to understand degradation caused by the LHWP and to 
determine the feasibility of continuing with the LHWP in the future (Earle et al., 2005).   
Within the Orange-Senqu River basin, irrigation currently accounts for one-third 
of the total runoff and evaporation from storage and the growth of riparian vegetation 
accounts for less than one-fifth (Grafton et al., 2013).  As in both the Yellow and Murray-
Darling Rivers, the Orange-Senqu River basin is currently experiencing water quality 
challenges as a result of decreased flow.  This imposes a direct economic cost on the 
downstream population due to increased water purification costs, decreased agricultural 
productivity and loss of water due to dilution, as well as an environmental cost to the 
plants and animals that rely on riparian ecosystems for survival (Grafton et al., 2013).   
In China, water-use reductions were mandated by the central government in 
response to a decline in flow at the mouth of the Yellow River, however, in other political 
climates, reallocating water to the environment may not be so simple (Grafton et al., 
2013).  For example, the Orange-Senqu River basin is governed by four separate 
countries and coordination of actions between all four countries is difficult and highly 
charged, particularly when the amount of rainfall reaching each country is 
disproportionate by size.  The same is true for the Colorado River in the southwestern 
United States and northern Mexico.  A treaty exists between the U.S. and Mexico, but if 
the water is not in the United States in the first place (rising temperatures, decreasing 
precipitation), there is little chance of Mexico being satisfied by the amount of water it 
receives.   
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Water allocations within the Murray-Darling River basin vary based on the 
amount of available water at a certain time.  New South Wales and Victoria are each 
allotted half of the yearly flow of the Murray River after a percentage is delivered to 
South Australia (Wildman Jr. and Forde, 2012).  Consumption of water is therefore 
seasonally based, unlike within the Colorado River, where certain amounts of water are 
expected despite variability in flow within the basin on an annual or sub-annual basis. 
The Murray-Darling River basin has also experienced some increase in environmental 
flow by the voluntary sale of water rights by agriculturalists to each other and the 
government during times of droughts.  During drought, farmers who normally grew 
water-needy crops turned instead to selling shares of water to farmers who needed to 
keep livestock alive for the production of meat and dairy, and the government purchased 
shares in order to maintain environmental flow within the basin (Wildman Jr. and Forde, 
2012).  Maintaining environmental flow, though not believed to be as economically 
productive as agriculture, is essential to preventing further degradation of water and 
ecosystems.  Allowing degradation to occur will negatively affect agricultural 
productivity in addition to recreational riverine activities that also have economic 
potential (Sullivan, 2014).  When the Millennium drought ended, there remained little 
interest in maintaining reforms and an abundance of interest in returning to business as 
usual despite the fact that during the drought, the gross value of irrigated agricultural 
production was unchanged even with a 70% drop in water extractions from January 2000 
to August 2007 (Grafton et al., 2013).   
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The Colorado River 
The Colorado River basin encompasses seven states in the western and 
southwestern United States, divided into an Upper and Lower Basin, as well as parts of 
northern Mexico (Figure 10).  Flow within the Colorado River mainly consists of water 
from snowmelt and over 90% of the flow originates from above the Grand Canyon 
(Arizona), indicating that areas downstream rely almost entirely on Upper Basin 
snowmelt.  Meltwater within the river is primarily used to maintain water levels in both 
Lake Mead and Lake Powell, reservoirs constructed in the 1930s for the purpose of 
maintaining water security in the future, which provide water to cities like Las Vegas and 
Phoenix.  Together these reservoirs increase the storage of the Colorado River Basin to 
four times the annual flow (Grafton et al., 2013; Wildman Jr. and Forde, 2012).   
Within the United States alone, water from the Colorado River basin is used by 30 
million people and 4 million acres of farmland, but by 2020, the population relying on 
this water is expected to reach 38 million (Belnap and Campbell, 2011; Wildman Jr., and 
Forde, 2012).  The Colorado River flows through both the western United States and 
northern Mexico, making the river a shared resource.  As a result, water contained within 
the river is allocated between both countries.  The United States is obligated to provide 
1,845 km
3
/year of water to Mexico (Grafton et al., 2013).  Paleoclimate records indicate 
that periods of drought, including the one occurring in the southwestern United States at 
present, have occurred periodically throughout the past thousand years and sustained 
dryness at present and in the future makes it unlikely that water deliveries stemming from 
the Colorado River Basin will be sustainable in the years to come (Cayan et al., 2010). 
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Figure 10: The Colorado River basin; the Upper Basin is outlined in red and the Lower 
Basin and Mexican portions of the basin shown in brown, from Belnap and 
Campbell (2011). 
Cayan et al. (2010) identified eleven extreme drought years in the southwestern 
United States, three of which (2002, 2007, and 2008) occurred since the beginning of the 
21
st
 century.  However these three extreme years are part of a larger drought that began in 
2000, with higher than average temperatures across the entire western United States and 
lower than average precipitation (< 30
th
 percentile) from the Pacific Coast to the interior 
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of the country; this drought caused streamflow below levels of flow seen during the Dust 
Bowl (Belnap and Campbell, 2011).  The main cause of the extreme drought in 2002 was 
a lack of rainfall (< 20
th
 percentile), but from 2000 to 2007, temperatures remained higher 
than average, peaking in 2000 and again in 2009 (Cayan et al., 2010).   
Extreme drought conditions do not occur just once each year, but are rather built 
up over time.  Two years prior to the extreme drought years since the start of the 21
st
 
century, average annual runoff was only 85% of normal.  One year prior, runoff averaged 
81% of normal.  One year after each extreme drought year, annual runoff averaged only 
80% of normal (Cayan et al., 2010).  These extreme conditions reach into the past and 
future to influence water resources and are caused by below average precipitation and 
above average temperatures (Figure 11).  This combination can positively affect 
evapotranspiration and lead to below average soil moisture, which directly influences 
runoff, and creates a negative feedback loop (Cayan et al., 2010).  By 2050, rising 
temperature alone is expected to cause soil moisture levels to fall below those 
experienced during the Dust Bowl and the southwestern drought of the early 21
st
 century 
and flow within the basin is projected to decrease by 5% to 20% of current levels (Belnap 
and Campbell, 2011). 
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Figure 11: Modelled changes in average annual precipitation and evaporation 
(available runoff) in the southwestern United States through 2100.  
Precipitation minus evaporation averaged over nineteen separate models 
(red), 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles (pink), median precipitation (blue), median 
evaporation (green), from Belnap and Campbell (2011).  
The allocation of water within the Colorado River basin is restricted to surface 
water (runoff), but there are groundwater resources that will likely need to be utilized if 
surface water allocations are continued to be met and hydropower production along the 
river is to remain active during times of drought.  Drought began in the southwest in 
2000, and by 2004, water availability from Lake Powell and Lake Mead had declined 
drastically.  As a result, rigorous reservoir management and supplementing surface water 
with groundwater and surface water from other locations was necessary to deliver 
Colorado River promised amounts of water to promised locations and to sustain 
electricity production (Castle et al., 2014).  Storage of freshwater within the basin 
declined dramatically: an average of -7.2 ± 0.8 km
3
/year from December 2004 to January 
2013.  Data from the NASA Gravity Recovery and Climate Experiment (GRACE) 
measured total freshwater storage from January 2003 to November 2013 and further 
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results from a water-balance equation showed the differences in groundwater and 
reservoir storage (Lake Mead and Lake Powell) over time (Figure 12) (Castle et al., 
2014).  Results from GRACE indicate that although surface storage in reservoirs held 
relatively constant, groundwater storage decreased and is currently below average 
because of the reliance on groundwater during times of drought (Castle et al., 2014). 
 
Figure 12: A. Monthly deviations in total water storage (km
3
) in the Colorado River 
Basin from the average total water storage for the entire period (2003-2014) 
as measured by GRACE.  B. Monthly deviations (km
3
) in groundwater 
storage and surface water storage in reservoirs from average basin storage 
from December 2004 to November 2013, from Castle et al. (2014).  
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In 2011, the U. S. Bureau of Reclamation, which manages dams and reservoirs 
within the Colorado River Basin, acknowledged for the first time that demand for water 
exceeds the amount of available water in the basin.  The Bureau cited climate change as 
contributing to lower runoff, with the expectation that climate change will continue to 
negatively impact the water regime in the future through more frequent droughts due to 
warming and increasing aridity, increasing evapotranspiration, and decreasing snowfall 
(USBR, 2011; Wildman Jr. and Forde, 2012). There are guidelines for the basin-wide 
distribution of water should there be a water shortage, but these are based on where water 
was historically attributed.  A 1929 agreement states that Arizona, for example, is not 
allowed any water until the amount required for California has been delivered, indicating 
that in times of drought, the people of Arizona are much more likely to suffer than those 
in southern California.  Furthermore, Nevada maintains a relatively constant share of the 
water, decreasing deliveries by only 5%, and is not as likely to suffer during a mild 
drought (Wildman Jr. and Forde, 2012).  
For the case of prolonged drought and increasing aridity, the law requires nothing 
other than a meeting between the seven basin states to discuss water distribution.  As a 
result, Arizona and Nevada both store excess water beneath the surface as groundwater as 
a secondary source of water, since reductions in allotted deliveries could place a 
significant burden upon the population.  Being the farthest downstream (with the 
exception of Mexico) and the youngest in terms of water rights, Arizona and Nevada are 
in the most perilous positions in terms of water scarcity, as deliveries to other states take 
precedence and the likelihood of other basin states sharing the burden of water 
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restrictions during prolonged droughts is slim (Wildman Jr. and Forde, 2012).  
Furthermore, since there is no unclaimed water within the Colorado River basin to 
supplement allocated deliveries, in times of shortage, someone is guaranteed to suffer 
(Schuster and Colby, 2013). 
From a combination of hydrological models and global climate models, Cayan et 
al. (2010) project that by the second half of the 21
st
 century, the incidence and longevity 
of extreme drought events will increase, with the majority of the projected droughts 
lasting longer than five years, and in three extreme cases lasting longer than twelve years.  
A drought similar to the drought of the early 21
st
 century is likely to reoccur before 2100. 
The U. S. Bureau of Reclamation did not acknowledge this possibility in its guidelines 
for water shortages, and has likely overestimated future water supply as a result 
(Wildman Jr. and Forde, 2012).  Soil moisture deficits are projected to reach 1.7 to 2 
standard deviations below the mean as a result of elevated temperatures and increased 
evapotranspiration, as well as a reduction in snowpack and consequently spring 
meltwater, indicating that both ground and surface water storage will suffer more in the 
future (Barnett et al., 2008; Cayan et al., 2010).  Though these results do factor in a 
changing climate as a result of greenhouse gas emissions (using IPCC emissions 
scenarios for moderately high and low emissions to the same result), the models of Cayan 
et al. (2010) do not take into account the effect of human withdrawals on droughts, and it 
can be expected that anthropogenic water withdrawals will enhance drought conditions, 
continue to deplete renewable water supply, and drain non-renewable groundwater from 
the basin (Castle et al., 2014). 
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There are a wide range of future projections, stemming from the use of different 
global climate models and different IPCC emissions scenarios, but increasing 
temperatures and decreasing precipitation throughout the Colorado River basin in the 
future are almost certain and will occur as a result of anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
emissions (Vano et al., 2014).  The magnitude of the changes in runoff as a result of this 
climate change is still highly variable, but warmer temperatures are projected to result in 
a 5% to 45% decrease in runoff, and changes in precipitation will cause even more 
decline (Dawadi and Ahmad, 2012; Vano et al., 2014).  This will further impact water 
stored within Lake Mead and Lake Powell, which could experience a 10% to 30% 
reduction in available water by 2060 (Dawadi and Ahmad, 2012).  Additionally, if the 
water levels in Lake Mead fall below 320 m, hydroelectric power production at the 
Hoover Dam cannot continue (as of March 22, 2015, Lake Mead water elevation was 331 
m), leaving up to 1.3 million people in Arizona, California, and Nevada without power 
and with little water (Dawadi and Ahmad, 2012; USBR, 2009).  There is a 50% chance of 
this happening as soon as 2017 (Barnett and Pierce, 2008). 
The outflow of the Colorado River at the United States-Mexican border is already 
only a fraction of the flow measured at Lees Ferry in Northern Arizona, and  none of the 
water in the Colorado River at that location has reached the Gulf of California since the 
1990s (Grafton et al, 2013).  As a result, the Colorado River delta has shrunk to 5% of its 
original area and diverse native plant species have succumb to non-native, salt-tolerant 
species that provide little room for biodiversity. The lack of water reaching the ocean can 
be partially accounted for by increased evaporation, but there has been no basin-wide 
 36 
decrease in precipitation, and therefore the discrepancy in flow between the Colorado 
River at Lees Ferry and the Colorado River delta can be largely explained by water 
extraction for human use (Grafton et al., 2013).  In May 2014, a 130 million m
3
 pulse of 
water released from Lake Mead in March 2014 reached the Gulf of California (Voiland, 
2014).  This occurred because a section of Minute 319, part of the United-States Mexico 
Water Treaty which allows storage of Mexican water in Lake Mead, allowed an 
experiment to determine how the Colorado River delta would react to restored flow to 
occur (Flessa et al., 2013). 
Environmental experiments notwithstanding, there remains a need for prolonged 
change within the Colorado River basin if millions of people are to retain access to 
freshwater, and especially if agricultural production is to continue.  Already in northern 
Mexico the timing and amount of water supplied to farmers for irrigation is uncertain and 
as a result, crop yields suffer and the farmers lose money (Schuster and Colby, 2013).  
There are some solutions in the form of crop management (growing crops that need less 
water), and improving irrigation (lining canals with cement or switching to drip 
irrigation), but trading water rights remains a solution that could aid both the environment 
and the economy (Schuster and Colby, 2013).  There is a history of water rights trading in 
the United States.  In Arizona and New Mexico, water rights can be traded provided the 
rights were granted prior to 1919 and 1907, respectively, but the waiting period to 
complete the trade can take over a year (Wildman Jr. and Forde, 2012).  These small 
transactions would need to reach a much larger area if any substantial progress is to be 
made in the Colorado River basin, and trades need to be able to be completed rapidly.   
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The success of water trading in Australia during times of drought indicates that 
similar trading could be successful between states in the Colorado River basin, provided 
standardization and regulation of trading. Like in the Murray-Darling River basin in 
southeastern Australia, among the Colorado River basin states there are a variety of 
different agricultural uses for water.  Depending on the crop, trades could take place 
throughout the year based on who has extra availability and in the Colorado River basin 
there already exists the ability to transfer water between many states (Wildman Jr. and 
Forde, 2012).  The current program of giving pre-allocated amounts of water according to 
seniority will not be sustainable in a more arid future, when pre-allocated amounts may 
no longer be available, leaving junior users with little, or no, water.  However, in the 
interest of maintaining tradition while not losing the support of senior water rights 
holders, seniority could be a structural part of water trading (higher water prices for 
junior members) without discouraging junior members from taking part because of 
greater access to available water (Wildman Jr. and Forde, 2012). 
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Concluding Remarks 
 In the United States, the value of water is not always appreciated in part because 
water infrastructure systems and delivery have been safe and secure for many decades.  
Each person uses an average of 147 gallons each day, and water is a cheap commodity, 
more so than electricity or gasoline, adding to the misconception that water is and always 
will be plentiful and abundant (Barnett, 2011).  Americans who live in warm climates use 
upwards of 67% of their total household water on landscaping and maintaining 
unnecessarily green yards, and the hotels and casinos of Las Vegas sport fountains the 
size of football fields (a city relying solely on Lake Mead and the Colorado River for 
water) (Barnett, 2011; Fishman 2011).  Las Vegas has taken strides to encourage the use 
of recycled and purified wastewater in fountains and to maintain golf courses, but at least 
once over, this water has been removed from the system, water that could otherwise be 
used for electricity, irrigation, or left in place for downstream users (Fishman, 2011).  A 
fundamental shift in the way that Americans view water will be necessary to maintain 
availability in the future.  Having a green yard or experiencing the illusion of grandeur 
while on vacation in the driest large city in the nation must be balanced with the need to 
maintain hydroelectric power, supply homes with clean drinking water, irrigate fields to 
provide food to a growing population, and ideally, maintain environmental levels of flow 
within river basins to preserve biodiversity and riparian landscapes. 
It is not just the Colorado River basin that is already experiencing a decrease in 
available water, but many other river basins across the globe: the Yellow River (China), 
the Murray-Darling River (Australia), and the Orange-Senqu River (southern Africa), for 
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example (Grafton et al., 2013).  More basins, such as those located in the Mediterranean, 
southern Africa, the Middle East and Arab regions, and central and southern Asia are 
projected to follow the same pattern of decreasing availability as climate change 
continues to increase temperatures and affect patterns of precipitation across the globe.  
Worldwide population is expected to continue growing for the foreseeable future and the 
need for food production will grow with the population, therefore irrigation will be 
increasingly necessary.  As the global population grows and becomes more economically 
developed, so does the need for industrial and municipal water supply.   
Constructed reservoirs, which ideally store multiple years’ worth of water 
resources, provide a constantly evaporating body of water, and the levels are dictated 
entirely by human demand.  Water can be removed from regional storage at any point, 
the timing and amount of which can drastically affect runoff (and therefore influence 
water scarcity) much more than overall global water consumption.  Better reservoir 
management and improved irrigation are necessary to maintain adequate water resources 
globally, but moving food production to less water scarce regions would be a better 
option, though much more difficult to implement.  The changes necessary to cope with 
the effects of declining water availability on infrastructure and water services have 
potentially high economic costs in the form of response strategies such as the expansion 
of facilities, implementing new policy, and developing new technologies (Vörösmarty et 
al., 2000).  The consequences of not approaching the problem in a timely manner have 
potentially catastrophic effects: degradation of water quality and ecosystems, increased 
water pollution, reduction in crop production, as well as mass migration to more water-
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wealthy areas and conflict over water rights in international river basins (Vörösmarty et 
al., 2000).  Adaptation, mitigation, and compensation measures are crucial to approaching 
water resources management now and in the future. 
Public education, changes to policy, and collaboration between governmental 
agencies and scientists are all going to be essential to the development of strategies to 
manage and offset changes to water availability caused by global emissions.  Therefore, a 
first priority should be controlling (maintaining and then decreasing) emissions, which 
may help curb future changes to precipitation and temperature.  However, this requires 
global cooperation that is undeniably hard to achieve.  Other management techniques 
include increasing the efficiency of agricultural and industrial practices, garnering public 
support for municipal wastewater reuse, increasing collection and storage of rainwater, 
regulating river runoff, and exploring alternative forms of producing electricity through 
solar panels and wind turbines.  Desalination, which is currently used worldwide, for 
example in parts of Australia, Israel, and Saudi Arabia, may need to be used in other 
coastal locations or applied to non-traditional water resources such as those from 
industrial and energy-related processes (Fishman, 2011).  While the readily available and 
accessible sources of freshwater are largely allocated to established uses, solutions in the 
future will likely include a range of unconventional and innovative solutions to meet and 
reduce demands and needs for water. 
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